A low cost solution to authentication in passive RFID systems by Ranasinghe, Damith Chinthana et al.
  2006 Copyright  1  
The University of Adelaide 
A Low Cost Solution to 
Authentication in Passive 
RFID Systems  
 
Damith C. Ranasinghe, Daihyun Lim, Peter H. Cole and Srinivas 
Devadas 
 










Mr. Damith C. Ranasinghe 
PhD Student, Auto-ID Lab, ADELAIDE 
School of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineering, 
The University of Adelaide 
 
Prof. Peter H. Cole 
Research Director, Auto-ID Lab, ADELAIDE 
School of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineering, 




E-Mail: damith@eleceng.adelaide.edu.au, daihyn@mit.edu, 








  2006 Copyright  2  
The University of Adelaide 
Abstract 
This paper aims to propose a solution to address the issue of authentication to prevent 
counterfeiting in a low cost RFID based system based on using Physically Uncloneable 
Functions. 
1. Introduction 
In the implementation of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems concerns have been 
raised regarding security and violations of end-user privacy. Those concerns may be 
alleviated using cryptographic primitives.  
Despite the vast array of RFID systems, those that are at the low cost end pose the greatest 
threat to security and privacy due to the possibility of wide scale deployment and inherent 
constraints that place severe limitations on the number of possible solutions. 
There is a large collection of literature available on efficient and inexpensive cryptographic 
engines suitable for smart card applications, but the use of such engines is an extravagant 
solution for low cost RFID systems that are beginning to proliferate within global supply 
chains. 
A primary concern with current low cost RFID systems is a cloning attack. The following 
sections will examine the vulnerabilities of low cost RFID systems to cloning attacks and the 
consequences of such an attack. A simple means of addressing this issue is to implement a 
security service on the tag that can achieve the security objective of authentication. The 
issues are elaborated below. 
1.1. Cloning 
Cloning genuine RFID tags to impersonate tags (imitating the behaviour of a genuine tag) 
presents a serious threat to an RFID system. Using cloning attacks to impersonate tags will 
add a new dimension to thieving as attackers are able to write EPC data onto devices that 
function like RFID tags.  
A direct consequence of cloning is the possibility for counterfeiting, where a genuine article 
tagged with an RFID label, may be reproduced as a cheap counterfeit and tagged with a 
clone of the authentic RFID label. The ‘track and trace’ concept outlined in [1] is one possible 
solution to detecting such a counterfeited product in a supply chain application. 
At the time of writing there is no mechanism for a reader to verify that it is communicating 
with a genuine RFID label and not a fraudulent label. Thus a thief may replace a tag of a 
valid item with a fake tag or replace the tag of an expensive item with that of a fake tag with 
data obtained from a cheaper item. Hence the lack of a means for authentication allows an 
adversary to fool a security system into perceiving that the item is still present or this may 
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fool automated checkout counters into charging for a cheaper item. Such fake labels may 
also be used to create imitation items.  
Since there is presently no mechanism for a reader to authenticate itself to a label or a label 
to authenticate itself to a reader, labels and readers are constantly in an un-trusted 
environment where the integrity of messages is doubtful and there are no means for 
establishing the legitimacy of a reader by a label or the legitimacy of a label by a reader. 
Clearly more expensive RFID system implementations are also not immune from cloning as 
shown by a more recent cloning attack published in [2] where a cloned tag was used in the 
purchase of fuel at a service station and to start an automobile locked with a RFID based car 
immobiliser. A similar example of cloning of proximity cards is given in [3] while the possibility 
of cloning the VeriChip [4] in a discussion of its possible use to tag employees was outlined in 
[5]. 
1.2. Authentication 
In an RFID context authentication simplifies to the corroboration of the identity of a tag or a 
reader. Authentication is an important RFID security measure for preventing counterfeit 
manufacture or substitution by cloning authentic RFID labels. It is also important for 
controlling access to label contents. Use of authentication may also be required in other 
applications of RFID technology such as baggage reconciliation or secure entry systems. 
The goal of an authentication scheme in RFID is to prevent an adversary from creating a 
fake tag to misrepresent the legitimate tag (and hence the authenticity of the object 
associated with the tag) by a carefully planned attack on the RFID system. There are a 
number of possible ways in which a low cost RFID system may be attacked to obtain the 
necessary information to clone a tag. Present systems based on Class I and Class II tags, 
passive eavesdropping or a scan of an RFID tag is enough to carry out a cloning attack [6]. 
1.3. Challenge-and-Response Protocol 
Practically all identification schemes or authentication schemes use a challenge and 
response protocol as illustrated in Fig.  1. Other identification schemes such as the Schnorr 
Identification Scheme [7] and the Okamoto Identification Scheme [8] are examples of more 
complex challenge and response mechanisms. The mechanism for authentication using 
challenge and response is described below [9]. 
In the context of an RFID system, where there is no secure channel for communication, the 
security of the mechanism relies on the secure storage of the key k and the inability of an 
adversary to compute the key k given both the ciphertext and plaintext.  
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1.4. Constructing a Challenge-and-Response 
Protocol 
It is possible to construct a challenge-and-response protocol using a variety of cryptographic 
tools. Most symmetric key encryption algorithms, such as AES, are suitable candidates. 
However, in terms of silicon they present expensive solutions, while at the same time the 
security provided by such schemes remains vulnerable to various invasive and non-invasive 
physical attacks [10]. 
Attacks such as micro-probing, laser cutting, glitch attacks and power analysis attacks along 
with reverse engineering techniques used to reconstruct the layout of circuits have enabled 
adversaries to extract digital keys stored in the memory of integrated circuits. Security 
systems based on keeping a key a secret have thus been broken as a result. 
While various tamper-proofing methods have been developed over the years to counter such 
physical attacks they might be considered to be an extravagant solution for RFID 
applications. Such an example is the tamper sensing technology [10]. Using a sensor based 
on additional metallization layers allows interruptions and short circuits to be detected in the 
event of an attempt to tamper with the IC. However, such sensors only work while the IC is 
powered and such a sensor technology can only cause a degree of difficulty to an adversary 
attempting to obtain the key while the IC is powered as the key can still be extracted when 
the IC is powered off. 
Alternatives to storing keys on insecure hardware devices have been developed. Such an 
alternative is the introduction of physical one-way functions (POWFs) in [11] and [12]. The 
solution presented used a laser beam as an input to a transparent optical medium with 3D 
microstructure and the output was a quantification of the resulting interference pattern. The 
resultant output is dependent on the frequency and the angle of the laser beam entering the 
optical medium and the optical characteristics of the medium.  
1. Reader choses a challenge, x, which is a random number and transmits it to the reader. 
2. The label computes )(xey K=  and transmits the value y to the reader (here e is the 
encryption rule that is publicly known and k is a secret key know only to the reader and the 
particular label). 
3. The reader then computes  )(
' xey K=
. 
4. Then the reader verifies that  yy =
'
. 
Fig.  1: Challenge-response protocol. 
  2006 Copyright  5  
The University of Adelaide 
The concept of using physical unclonable functions (PUFs) was published in [13] and [14]. 
The ability to construct a PUF on silicon has far reaching implications since such a design 
can be easily fabricated into an IC using standard CMOS fabrication processes. The idea is 
based on using process variations, which are beyond a manufacturer’s control, in wires and 
transistors on an IC to obtain a characteristic response from each IC when given a certain 
input. The PUF circuit is able to uniquely characterise each IC due to manufacturing 
variations [13]. These individual characteristics then become similar to the secret keys used 
in a symmetrical encryption scheme. Thus, it is possible to identify and authenticate each IC 
reliably by observing the PUF response. The observation of PUF results reveals that a string 
of challenge bit sequences can be used to generate a response string unique to each IC.  
The particular advantage in this technique lies in the fact that an adversary can not construct 
a model or a device to clone a PUF as there can be a number of possible challenge-
response pairs, exponentially dependant on the number of challenges. Hence the system 
has computations security because a model based on an exhaustive search is impractical. 
However, the PUF based structure in [13] is sensitive to noise, especially thermal noise, as 
wire latencies and gate delays depend on operating temperature of the device. This leads to 
reliability issues when trying to obtain consistent responses for a given challenge.  
Unreliability due to such environmental variations have been addressed in a PUF 
configuration given in [15], where a challenge response pair is created using a PUF circuit 
that exploit process variation in the silicon fabrication using a differential topology, using only 
100s of gates. The design of such a PUF is considered in the following section. 
1.5. Physical Unclonable Functions 
A secret key extraction technique from the manufacturing variation in ICs [15] provides a 
suitable solution to create a low cost security engine on an RFID label that is both cost 
effective and can guard against tampering to extract secret keys stored on the tag to create 
clones. The technique employs a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) circuit which has the 
number of delay path configurations exponentially dependent on challenge input.  
1.5.1. Circuit Implementation 
The block diagram in Fig.  2 depicts the structure of a PUF circuit which is based on the 
arbiter-based PUF in [15 and 16]. The circuit accepts a n bit challenge b0, b2, b3, …, bn to 
form two delay paths in 2n different configurations. In order to generate a response bit, two 
delay paths are excited simultaneously to allow the transitions to race against each other. 
The arbiter block at the end of the delay paths determines which rising edge arrives first and 
sets its output to 0 or 1. The actual implementation of arbiter-based PUFs in [15 and 16] uses 
64 bit challenges. The details of the switch component are given in Fig.  3. 
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The switch component indicated in Fig.  2 is implemented using a pair of two-to-one 
multiplexers (refer to Fig.  3). Depending on the select bit Ci, the switch either allows the 
signal to travel straight through or swap the delay paths. The arbiter is constructed using a 
simple transparent latch with an active-low enable input. The arbiter favours the path to 
output zero since it is preset to zero and requires a setup time constraint to switch to a logic 
one. Fixing a small number of most significant challenge bits can compensate for this skew 
by effectively lengthen one delay path. The layout was carefully done to ensure that both 
























Arbiter operation as the
race between the signal





Fig.  2: Arbiter-based PUF circuit implementation. 
 
 
Fig.  3: Switch component implemented using two-to-one multiplexers to swap two delay paths [15]. 
The chip used in testing was built in TSMC’s 0.18 µm, single poly, 6-level metal process with 
standard cells [16]. The chip contains eight sets of the arbiter-based PUF circuits capable of 
generating an 8 bit response for a given challenge and a JTAG-like serial interface for 
communication. The total area of the eight PUF circuits is 1212 µm x 1212 µm and the chip 
can be operated 100 MHz [15 and 16]. 
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1.5.2. Design Analysis 
Manufacturers attempt to control process variations to a great degree however, these 
variations are largely beyond their control and hence it is not possible for an adversary to 
fabricate identical PUF circuits. It is estimated in [17] that there is a strong enough variation 
between chip to chip fabricated from the same silicon wafer for a sufficient number of random 
challenges to identify billions of chips. The probability that the first measured response bits to 
a given challenge (set of bits) on a chip is different from the measured response for the same 
set of bits (challenge) on a different chip is estimate to be 23% to 40% depending on the PUF 
circuit architecture [17]. It has been estimated that about 800 challenge response pairs are 
sufficient to distinguish 109 chips with the probability p ~ 1 - 5×1010 [17]. Such an 
identification scheme can be implemented with less than 1000 gates on an RFID silicon 
design 
The input and output functions of the generator are responsible for most of the power 
consumption in the PUF and the power consumption of the generator core is relatively small. 
The total power consumption of a PUF circuit is about 130 µW in our implementation. This is 
largely because of the external circuits used for feeding input values to the PUF and 
obtaining results from the PUF, nevertheless it is relatively a small value. 





































Challenges that produce unstable responses 
 
Fig.  4: The density function of the random variable k, where k is the number of 1’s out of 500 repetitive 
measurements. 
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1.5.3. Increasing the Dynamic Range of Operation 
However, the responses from a PUF are sensitive to environmental conditions such as 
temperature and power supply voltage.  That is a challenge that generates a reliable 
responses may not generate a reliable responses if environmental conditions change beyond 
a tolerance level. This issue is highlighted in Fig.  4 where results of 500 repetitive 
measurements of 1000 challenges are shown. The design in Fig.  2 presented in [15], is used 
to mitigate the effects of environmental noise based on the fact that noise would affect both 
signal propagations paths in an identical manner and thus the final results of the circuit are 
unchanged.    
The generator is sensitive to the power supply voltage and the temperature of the 
surrounding environment [15]. However problems caused by operational voltage changes 
can be minimised by the fabrication of a voltage regulator on the PUF.  
1.5.4. Possible Attacks 
The security of the above system relies on a PUF to securely store a unique secret key in the 
form of fabrication variations. The PUF based security systems are susceptible to reliability 
issues as discussed in Section  1.5.2 and  1.5.3 of this paper; however this is still an active 
area of research. The most probable attacks on a PUF based challenge response system are 
outlined in [15]. 
The security of the systems based on PUFs will depends on the difficulty of replicating a PUF 
circuit and on the difficulty of modelling the PUF circuit successfully. This is not a simple 
process and is therefore an adequate deterrent depending on the value of the article being 
authenticated by the reader. 
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2. Application to RFID Authentication 

































Fig.  5: Block diagram of a passive UHF/HF RFID label. 
Fig.  5 is simplified block diagram of a passive RFID label, with the distinction between UHF 
and HF being the fact the in a HF system the local clock is generated by dividing down the 
CW frequency while for an UHF chip such a division is not possible and thus a low power 
local oscillator is used. Current fabrications of Class I labels consist of around 1000 to 4000 
logic gates while Class II labels may have several thousand more gates. An RFID 
microcircuit can be subdivided into three primary sections: RF front-end, Memory circuitry, 
and Finite State machine (label logic circuitry). Figure 5 is an illustration of a typical low cost 
RFID transponder (that is a passive label). The block diagram of a HF chip and a UHF chip 
varies little in that the primary difference being the way in which the local oscillator clock is 
derived. In a UHF chip there is a dedicated low power oscillator, while in a HF chip the clock 
signal is derived from the received carrier by dividing down the carrier (at 13.56 MHz) in 
steps. 
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2.1.1. RF Front-end 
RF front-end consists of antenna pads for attaching the terminal of the antenna to the label 
IC. The antenna input passes through circuits for ESD (electrostatic discharge) protection. 
The ASK (Amplitude Shift Keying) demodulation circuits extract the modulation dips from the 
received signal while the Rectifier, rectifies the received signal to generate power which must 
be regulated using a voltage regulator to avoid voltage surges due to variations in RF field 
intensities.  
Passive RFID chips consist of a relatively large capacitor following a rectifier for storing 
charge to power the circuit in the absence of a battery. It is important to note here that the 
capacitor occupies a relatively large portion of the silicon area and RFID chips consuming 
larger amounts of power will need higher capacity capacitors and thus will cost more. 
2.1.2. Memory Circuitry 
The IC has memory capacity in the order of hundreds of bits. Class 1 labels have only read 
only memory while Class II labels may have some read-write memory. Read write memory, at 
the time of writing is implemented using EEPROM and thus requires a large voltage before 
information can be written to memory. Thus a charge pump, consisting of a series of 
capacitors is required to achieve a voltage of about 17V for writing to the tag’s memory. 
The CRC circuits are used in the validating the CRC in the received data and commands 
from an interrogator. The CRC generation unit is also used in the computation of the CRC for 
data sent from the tag to an interrogator before being encoded for modulation by the Return 
link modulation encoder. 
In the implementation of an EPC tag the EEPROM will store the EPC number of the tag, and 
the rest of the memory (generally of the order of a few kilobytes) is available to the users. 
2.1.3. Finite State Machine (Logic Circuitry)  
The logic on board the chip will define the label functionality. Primarily, chip logic will execute 
reader commands and implement an anti-collision scheme that allows the reading of multiple 
labels by a reader. These logic circuits are highly specialised and optimised for their tasks. 
Furthermore, the logic circuits also control read and write access to the EEPROM memory 
circuits. 
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2.2. Challenging Aspects of implementing 
Authentication on Low Cost Tags 
There are a variety of reasons behind the difficulties faced by scientists in implementing 
existing authentication mechanism on RFID system other than that of tags being insecure 
environments for long term secret key storage following from the discussion in section  1.4 of 
this paper. The issue has been addressed in publications such as [18]. Perhaps the most 
important of all the issues considered and the most relevant to the current discussion on 
using PUF circuits for authentication is to also consider the fact that the communication 
between and tag and a reader is constantly exposed to eavesdropping. The aspects of 
eavesdropping and other vulnerabilities have been dealt with great detail in [6]. This problem 
is further highlighted by the fact that the current air interface protocol ratified by EPCglobal 
for Class I tags (C1G2) [18] has provision for establishing a secure communication layer, and 
it is left up to RFID IC developers to implement such, as perhaps a proprietary solution. 
2.3. PUF based RFID IC 
The idea of using a PUF in a low cost RFID label was first published in [20]. There are 
varieties of ways in which such a secret key extraction technique can be incorporated on to a 
low cost label due to the security it provides to the long term storage of secure keys on a 
RFID label. The following sections discuss two such schemes proposed. 
2.4. Tag Authentication 
Fig.  6 depicts a model of an RFID chip with an integrated PUF circuit while Fig.  7 illustrates 
the use of a PUF based RFID system. The discussion below using PUF security engines will 
assume using 800 challenge-response pairs as a sufficient number of challenges in a single 
set, as discussed in Section  1.5.2 of this paper.  
Building a symmetric key engine is still not a cost effective solution though certain advances 
have been made towards the development of hardware optimized encryptions engines in [21, 
22] and [23], they still present a performance hindrance to current RFID systems. Hence 
instead of using the PUF to obtain a secret key, PUF can be directly utilized as illustrated in 
Fig.  7 and Fig.  8.  
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Send randomly selected challenge set
Generate response and send
response
Compare label response with that
obtained from a secure database
 
Fig.  7: Message exchange between a reader and an RFID label during an authentication process. 
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EPCChallenge list Responses
E01 A1, B1, .. R1, R2, ...








Evaluate if the label
response matches the
expected response
obtained from a secure
database






Fig.  8: An overview of an implementation of a PUF based RFID system 
It is clear that once a challenge has been used it cannot be used again since an adversary 
may have observed it. However it is possible to have a list of challenges and responses or 
use an encrypted communication link to deliver challenge and obtain the responses. Then 
there remains the question of delivering a secure communication channel between a reader 
and the tag. A possible for obtaining such a communication layer encryption scheme is 
proposed in [20]. 
However, not all the challenges need to be discarded. A simple alternative to mechanism 
discussed above requires the reader to randomly alter the order in which challenges are 
given along with a tag’s security engine storing the 800 bit long response and xoring blocks 
of the response string will allow the challenges to be reused. Thus a third party observing the 
communication between a tag and reader is unable to formulate the correct challenge 
response pairs. This random organisation of the challenge string will allow the challenges to 




[C ,C ,C ,.........,C ]1 800 701 99
[R ,R ,R ,.........,R ]
XOR
001 002 003 100
[R ,R ,R ,.........,R ]
XOR
[R ,R ,R ,.........,R ]
XOR
[R ,R ,R ,.........,R ]
101 102 103 200
201 202 203 300
301 302 302 400
 
Fig.  9: Using randomised challenges and XORed responses to allow the re-use of challenges. 
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The above scheme will allow a label to authenticate itself to a reader before any sensitive 
information passes between the devices, but the fact remains that a reader still needs to 
identify a tag by requesting its unique identifier (such as the EPC in case of Class I tag 
implemented using the C1G2 protocol). The scheme also implies that the RFID tags be 
characterised with a number of challenge response sets. Thus in a supply chain environment 
a manufacture might have to perform individual tag characterisations using randomly 
selected challenges in a secure environment such as a Faraday’s cage. 
2.5. Tag and Reader Authentication (Mutual 
Authentication) 
It is possible to extend the above scheme to enable a tag to authenticate a reader and for a 
reader to authenticate a tag. This involves sending a select challenge set for which a tag 
generates a response string. The reply string will uniquely identify the tag, hence the reply 
can be used to access data related to a tag using a hash table (which will reduce the cost of 
searching for the response related data, hash tables generally use a hash function such as 
MD5 [9] and a important characteristic of the function must be that it is collision free). This 
scheme requires that the tag stores a temporary secret key RN and K (refer to Fig.  10) for 
encryption and that the reader has access to the hash table entries stored on a secure 











Fig.  10: RFID label with a PUF and extra memory to store secret key RN. 
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Send randomly selected challenge set
Generate response and send
response
Hash response and obtain item data
(EPC, RN). Use tag specific key K and
Send [RN K]Å
Authenticate Interrogator by
checking RN sent with that on
the label memory
Send (K_CRC EPC)Å
Authenticate label by checking Label
EPC sent with that on the secure
database. Send [RN1Å RN_CRC] Update RN on label with RN1
 
Fig.  11: Protocol for a non identifying label. 
The above scheme has the particular advantage that the an RFID label do not need to reveal 
its unique identifier, such as an EPC, and hence a third party is unable to obtain any useful 
information pointed to by the unique identifier, such as any information about the object to 
which the item is attached.  
3. Conclusion 
The PUF provides a cost effective solution to low cost RFID Systems. This security engine 
can be easily constructed using standard digital gates and layout tools and fabricated using 
standard CMOS technology. A 64-stage PUF circuit costs less than 1000 gates. Additionally, 
various kinds of low power techniques such as sub-threshold logic design and multi-
thresholds CMOS design can be utilized to reduce the power consumption to make it suitable 
for use in devices sensitive to low power consumption.  
The effects of environmental conditions on the measurements obtained from a PUF are 
documented in [20], and the symmetrical nature of the circuit counter acts to reduce much of 
the variation provided otherwise 
However, effects of power supply voltage still need to be investigated to discover practical 
performance boundaries such that the PUF can operate reliably. Nevertheless it is possible 
to fabricate a voltage regulator onboard the PUF to prevent effects from higher voltage 
variations, but it will not be able to counteract conditions induced by voltages below a 
calibrated power supply voltage. 
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Future work will also involve the investigations into the effects of voltage on the performance 
of the PUF. It is also left to investigate whether the generator throughput can be improved to 
reduce the time take for the execution of a challenge response protocol.  
Future work should also focus on elaborating the protocols used and investigating the 
possibility of designing commands and responses based on the current C1G2 protocol 
ratified by EPCglobal while at the same time performance issues related to the large 
amounts of data that needs to be transmitted to the tag and from the tag, and the time taken 
in memory storage and retrieval will also need to be investigated to further analyse 
performance issues related to using a PUF security engine on current Class I or Class II 
tags. 
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